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Comment
Follow the Giraffe’s Lead – Lanco, Inc. v. Director,
Division of Taxation Gets Lost in the Quagmire that
is State Taxation
Cory D. Olson*
When there is an income tax, the just will pay more and the unjust less.1
I. PIPE DREAMS OR A PIPELINE? LANCO,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CREATION OF TAX
FREE INCOME.
Everyone is familiar with Benjamin Franklin’s admonition
that nothing in this world is certain, except for death and taxes.
In fact, one wonders whether humankind has spent more time
searching for the Fountain of Youth or the perfect tax loophole.
While both endeavors have been fruitless, modern tax planners
have found a system which goes a long way toward achieving
one of these two goals. Using confusing and ambiguous
Supreme Court precedent as a cover, tax planners have found a
method of structuring assets that has the potential to save
companies millions of dollars in state taxation.
It is
accomplished through a tax tool known as a “passive
investment company,” or “PIC.” Combining the potential value
of intellectual property, the relative ease of creating and
maintaining subsidiary corporations, and favorable state tax
laws, companies have been able to use PICs to effectively shift
their income out of one state and into the state with the most
favorable tax laws, generally resulting in complete avoidance of
* J.D. Expected 2006, University of Minnesota Law School. I would
like to thank my parents for their never ending support, Carole Clark Isakson
for bringing this case to my attention, Sarah N. Andersen for listening to my
ideas even if none of it made any sense to her, and most of all God for opening
all of the doors in my life.
1. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, I.20 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Willey Book Co.
1901).
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state corporate income tax. Recognizing the threat to tax
revenue this method poses, states have taken steps to
recapture the income and re-subject it to state taxation. The
PICs and their holders have fought back, claiming that the
income derived from the intellectual property is outside of the
permissible reach of a state’s taxing powers.2
Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation3 is one of the
most recent salvos in the battle over whether a state can
constitutionally tax income shifted to a PIC. Lanco, Inc. was
incorporated in 1982 in Delaware.4 Lanco and Lane Bryant,
Inc., a national clothing retailer, are members of the same
corporate family, each ultimately owned by The Limited, Inc.5
After Lanco was incorporated, Lane Bryant assigned its
trademark “Lane Bryant,” together with the goodwill it had
developed, to Lanco for little or no consideration.6 Lanco
immediately licensed this intangible property back to Lane
Bryant for use in its operations, including operations taking
place in New Jersey.7 In exchange for the license, Lane Bryant
paid Lanco a royalty of 5.5% of the gross retail sales made by
Lane Bryant.8 Using this agreement as a jurisdictional hook,
the New Jersey Division of Taxation assessed Lanco with the
Corporate Business Tax,9 the state’s corporate income tax, for
income Lanco derived from the royalties paid by Lane Bryant.10
2. See, e.g., Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200 (N.J.
Tax Ct. 2003); Geoffrey Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
3. 21 N.J. Tax 200 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003).
4. Secretary of Revenue v. A&F Trademark, Inc., Admin. Decision No.
381 at 8 (N.C. Tax Review Bd. May 7 2002), available at
http://www.dor.state.nc.us/practitioner/hearing/A&F_TrademarkDecision2002.
pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
5. Id. The Limited, Inc. is an Ohio corporation which specializes in retail
clothing. Originally formed in 1963, The Limited, Inc. has expanded to
include twelve retailers and a combined total of more than five thousand
stores nationwide. The Limited, Inc. retailers include the well-known names
Abercrombie & Fitch, Express, and Victoria’s Secret. Id. at 3-4; A & F
Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 189 (N.C. App. 2004).
6. Secretary of Revenue, Admin. Decision No. 381 at 8.
7. See id. at 16; Brief of Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Comm’n at 2,
Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. Of Taxation, No. A-3285-03T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.
filed
2004),
available
at
http://www.mtc.gov/POLICY/LancoAmicusBriefFinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2005) [hereinafter Multistate Brief].
8. Multistate Brief, supra note 7, at 3.
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-1-41 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
10. While the two corporations are affiliated, this relationship ultimately
has no effect on whether Lanco should be subject to taxation. It is important,
however, to understand this relationship when analyzing the practical effects
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Lanco protested, claiming that since it did not have a physical
presence in New Jersey, a fact which New Jersey did not
contest, the state could not constitutionally assess the tax.11
The Division of Taxation disagreed with Lanco’s assertion that
it must be physically present in order to be taxed and argued
that the license agreement alone brought Lanco within the
state’s taxing jurisdiction.12
The case boiled down to one question: does a company
whose sole connection with a state is a licensing agreement on
intellectual property located within the state have a sufficient
nexus with the state such that it may be subject to state income
taxes?13 Intellectual property can be a company’s top asset
and, as a result, can be strategically used to avoid taxation,
such as through a PIC.14 Whether in the form of registered
trademarks, patents, copyrights, or simply “goodwill,” every
company is going to have some form of intellectual property. If
a simple licensing agreement is enough to avoid state taxation,
then every business, every patent holder, artist, or other owner
of intellectual property can dodge New Jersey taxation. The
level of revenue at stake is anything but inconsequential. With
states facing declining revenues, PICs threatening to exempt
millions in taxes, and few options to address the problem other
than through direct taxation, the ultimate outcome of Lanco
carried a large potential impact for tax payers and tax
assessors alike.
This goal of this Comment is to demonstrate why Lanco
and other PICs should be subject to state taxation. Despite the
Supreme Court’s admonition that state taxation cases
represent something of a “quagmire,”15 this Comment will first
unravel the cases and explain the basic parameters that
confine state taxation. Next, the comment will discuss how
other courts have addressed the same question at issue in
of the Lanco decision and how courts should consider similar future issues.
11. See Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 216 (N.J.
Tax Ct. 2003); Multistate Brief, supra note 7, at 4.
12. See Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 215-16.
13. See id. at 200.
14. See George T. Bell et al., A State Tax Strategy for Trademarks, 81
Trademark Rep. 445, 445 (1991).
15. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992). The Supreme
Court conceded that the law regarding interstate taxation is something of a
“quagmire . . . [leaving] much room for controversy and confusion and little in
the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable
power of taxation.” Id. at 215-16 (quoting Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959)).
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Lanco and how courts and commentators have reacted to those
decisions. Third, this comment will analyze the Lanco decision
and will explain why the Lanco court decided the case
incorrectly.
This Comment will show that even having
incorrectly required a physical presence, the Lanco court still
should have decided in New Jersey’s favor; however, the court
incorrectly read Supreme Court precedent and applied the
incorrect test. Having made these two critical errors, this
Comment concludes that the Lanco court reached the wrong
outcome and prevented New Jersey from subjecting Lanco, or
any other PIC or similar tax device, to the state business
income tax.
II. STATE TAXATION AND ITS CONFINES – UNRAVELING
THE QUAGMIRE THAT IS STATE TAXATION
A. EARLY VIEWS OF INTERSTATE TAXATION
After the Revolutionary War, a young nation discovered
that it was not a unified country but an association of
independent states organized under the Articles of
Confederation. As a result of this independence, states were
free to tax imports and exports as if the states were
independent countries.16 This independence inevitably caused
deep animosity between the states and in turn threatened the
emerging nation.17 Seeking to address the failures of the
Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress gave
Congress the sole power to regulate trade “among the several
states.”18 Not only was this sole power an affirmative grant of
power, but it contained an implied limit on state power as well.
This negative power, known as the Dormant Commerce Clause,
prohibits certain state acts that interfere with interstate
commerce.19
Early challenges to state taxation of interstate business
took advantage of the Supreme Court’s laissez faire
interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, which
16. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 274 (James Madison) (Random
House 1937).
17. See id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
222, 231-232, 239 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring)); South Carolina State
Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1938).
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prohibited any taxation of interstate goods or services.20
Congress alone possessed the power to regulate interstate
commerce and any form of taxation by the states encroached
upon this power.21 This general prohibition on interstate
taxation continued for nearly seventy-five years, lasting into
the 1890s.22 Around the turn of the century, the Court began to
retreat from its earlier philosophy. For example, in Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor,23 the Court upheld a tax
based on the apportioned market value of a corporation, which
included goodwill derived from instate transactions, even
though it was a tax on interstate activity.24 This ushered in an
era in which concern shifted away from protecting interstate
commerce from any tax burden to a system that ensured that
interstate commerce was only subject to one state’s taxes.25
By the middle of the twentieth century, states were again
expanding their taxing jurisdiction to include entities located
outside of their respective territorial boundaries.26 At this
20. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 448 (1827) (“Any charge on the
introduction and incorporation of the articles into and with the mass of
property in the country, must be hostile to the power given to Congress to
regulate commerce, since an essential part of that regulation, and principal
object of it, is to prescribe the regular means for accomplishing that
introduction and incorporation.”).
21. See id. at 447-48.
22. See, e.g., Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888) (“In our
opinion such a construction of the Constitution leads to the conclusion that no
State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, . . . and
the reason is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to
a regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress.”).
23. 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
24. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220-21 (1897).
25. See W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258 (1938).
But we think the [gross receipts] tax assailed here finds support in
reason, and in the practical needs of a taxing system which, under
constitutional limitations, must accommodate itself to the double
demand that interstate business shall pay its way, and that at the
same time it shall not be burdened with cumulative exactions which
are not similarly laid on local business.
Id.
26. See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342-43 (1954).
In the last twenty years, revenue needs have come to exceed the
demands that legislatures feel it expedient to make upon
accumulated wealth or property with fixed location within the state.
The states therefore have turned to taxing activities connected with
the movement of commerce, such as exchange and consumption. If
there is some jurisdictional fact or event to serve as a conductor, the
reach of the state’s taxing power may be carried to objects of taxation
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point, state jurisdictional powers met up against the second
constitutional restriction: the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.27 Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
due process was concerned with territorial restrictions; thus,
states were prevented from asserting jurisdiction outside of
their borders.28 This did not mean businesses located outside of
a state’s borders were exempt from taxation. States were still
allowed to tax interstate commerce so long as there was “some
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,”29 and “the
state [had] given anything for which it [could] ask in return.”30
According to this formula, a state could only tax that which was
located inside its borders. This view was based on the belief
that a state provides benefits to those who were located there
and that the residents could be forced to pay their share of the
cost for these protections.31 Thus, as states were allowed to
expand their reach to include non-citizens,32 the Court required
beyond its borders.
Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344-45.
Id.
State of Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).

31. See id. at 445 (stating that the test was a reformulation of the classic
approach in Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932)). According
to the Lawrence Court,
[t]he obligation of one domiciled within a state to pay taxes there,
arises from unilateral action of the state government in the exercise
of the most plenary of sovereign powers, that to raise revenue to
defray the expenses of government and to distribute its burdens
equably among those who enjoy its benefits. Hence, domicile in itself
establishes a basis for taxation. Enjoyment of the privileges of
residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the
protection of its laws, are inseparable from the responsibility for
sharing the costs of government.
Lawrence, 286 U.S. at 279. The reformulation found in Wisconsin v. J.C.
Penney Co., 323 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), extended this concept of
domicile as a basis for taxation to an entity operating within the physical
boundaries of a state being responsible to help defray the governmental
expenses. Presumably, an entity which was not a domiciliary of a state but
which simply entered a state’s jurisdiction would not be subject to taxation
since the state government would not be providing any protections.
32. See Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 342-43. The Miller Bros. Court stated:
visible territorial boundaries do not always establish the limits of a
state’s taxing power or jurisdiction . . . If there is some jurisdictional
fact or event to serve as a conductor, the reach of the state’s taxing
power may be carried to objects of taxation beyond its borders . . . .
[I]f [a state] has jurisdiction of [an entity’s] taxable property or
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a showing of a territorial link between the state and the taxed
entity, a restriction consistent with the then current notions of
territorial jurisdiction.33 Once this territorial connection was
found, however, all of an entity’s in-state activities could be
taxed, even if those activities were not directly related to the
physical presence.34
B. THE COMPLETE AUTO PRONGS – THE CONCEPTS COME
TOGETHER
In the 1977 case, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady35
the Due Process and Commerce Clause considerations were
synthesized into a seemingly straightforward four-prong test.36
Under the Complete Auto test, a tax will be sustained if it (1) is
fairly apportioned; (2) does not discriminate against interstate
commerce; (3) is fairly related to the services provided by the
state; and (4) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
to the taxing state.37 Dormant Commerce Clause concerns are
addressed by the first two prongs of the test.
Fair
apportionment, the first prong, prevents states from
overreaching and taxing activities unconnected with the state.
Reaching a determination of whether a tax is fairly
apportioned under the first prong of the Complete Auto test is a
two step process. First, the court must decide whether the tax
is “internally” consistent.38 “Internal consistency is preserved
transactions, it may sometimes, through these, reach the nonresident.
Id.
33. See, e.g., id. at 347 (holding that a store which sold goods to Maryland
residents but did not enter Maryland was not subject to forced collection of use
taxes); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1960) (holding that the
presence of independent contractors was sufficient to subject the entity to
state taxation); National Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551, 552, 562 (1977) (holding that the maintenance of two offices with two to
four employees each was sufficient to give California the power to tax all of
National Geographic’s activities within the state).
34. See, e.g., National Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 561 (holding that
physical presence of offices creating jurisdiction hook to tax all in state
magazine sales); D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988) (upholding
assessment of use tax based on value of magazines sent from out of state against
physically present retailer); Department of Revenue v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 660 P.2d
1188 (Alaska 1983) (upholding assessment of sales tax on mail orders sent from out of
state center of physically present retailer).
35. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
36. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279 (1977).
37. See id.
38. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185
(1995).
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when the imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by
every other State would add no burden to interstate commerce
that intrastate commerce would not also bear.”39 This test does
not look to the economic reality of the tax, but merely whether
the imposition of the exact formula in every other state would
place a greater burden on interstate commerce than on
intrastate commerce.40 If this test is met, a court then looks to
see whether the tax is “externally” consistent.41 “External
consistency . . . looks not to the logical consequences of cloning,
but to the economic justification for the State’s claim upon the
value taxed, to discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond
that portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic
activity within the taxing State.”42 External consistency looks
for a real threat of multiple taxation, even if it is not through
identical statutes.43 Such a threat may be a sign that one state
is overreaching its fair portion of income attributable to that
state.44
Moving to the second prong, state taxes may not
discriminate against interstate commerce. While in some ways
this test is similar to the apportionment tests under the first
prong,45 this test is broader, as it checks for all forms of
discrimination against interstate or out-of-state activities.46
For example, a state may not tax interstate commerce or
activities occurring wholly in another state at a higher rate
than what local activities are charged.47
39. Id.
40. Id. For an example of a tax that is externally inconsistent, see Am.
Trucking Ass’n. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (invalidating a flat tax as
discriminatory against interstate commerce).
41. Okla. Tax Comm., 514 U.S. at 185.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. By subjecting the interstate operator to a higher tax burden, the state
is discriminating in favor of the intrastate carrier. Whether it is using a tax
structure that subjects the interstate carrier to higher taxes (internal
consistency) or using a system that possibly subjects income to double taxation
(external consistency), the main concern is discrimination.
46. Okla. Tax Comm., 514 U.S. at 197-98.
47. See e.g., American Trucking Ass’n. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 266-67
(1987) (holding a flat tax discriminatory because it subjects interstate carriers
to a higher per-mile fee than intrastate carriers); Boston Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm’n., 429 U.S. 318319, 337 (1977) (holding a taxing scheme which
charged out-of-state sales on securities transactions a higher tax as
discrimination against interstate activities).
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The third and fourth prongs, fair relation and substantial
nexus, ensure that the state remains within the confines of the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution, the second limit on
interstate taxation.48 Consistent with the old territorial limits
of due process, the fourth prong requires a “definite link” or
ensures there is a “minimum connection between a state and
The third prong
the person, property or transaction.”49
requires a rational relationship between the tax and the
activities connected with the state.50
While the Complete Auto prongs remained grounded in the
territorial based taxation restrictions, the rest of the due
process jurisprudence moved away from the old territorial
limits towards the goal of “fair play and substantial justice.”51
The notion of “presence” for jurisdictional due process broke out
of its territorial mold and turned upon a determination of
whether an entity had purposely availed itself of the
Taxation due process,
protections of the jurisdiction.52
however, continued to rely on a showing of physical presence.
Therefore, after Complete Auto, a disconnect formed between
personal jurisdiction due process, which extended to entities
that had purposefully availed themselves of the protections of
the jurisdiction, and taxation due process, which stopped at the
borders.
C. THE CHANGE IN DUE PROCESS: DOES IT CHANGE THE
COMPLETE AUTO TEST?
The expanded jurisdictional due process limits challenged
the validity of prior taxation cases which were based on the
older, territorial notions of the Due Process Clause. The
Supreme Court addressed this question in the 1992 case Quill
48. The third prong is derived from the territorial notions of the Due
Process Clause. It was this territorial presence of the taxed entity which
determined whether it was within the taxing jurisdiction or not. See supra
notes 28-34 and accompanying text. The fourth prong flows from the language
in Miller Bros. and Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co. See supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
49. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992); Miller Bros. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
50. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273
(1978).
51. International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
52. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-76 (1985).
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Corp. v. North Dakota.53 Quill, which did not own any tangible
property in North Dakota, sold office products across the
United States, including North Dakota, which were delivered to
customers via common carrier.54 North Dakota sought to
require Quill to charge North Dakotans a use tax which Quill
would then remit to the state.55 Factually, the case was
indistinguishable from National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois.56 In that case, the Court
used territorial notions of due process to hold that Illinois could
not force Bellas Hess to charge such a tax because it lacked
physical presence in the state.57 North Dakota argued that
modern due process left Bellas Hess untenable.58
The Court half agreed. Instead of completely overturning
or affirming Bellas Hess, the Quill Court split the “substantial
nexus” prong of the four-part Complete Auto Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady59 test.60 Rather than determining
whether there is a sufficient nexus in order to meet due process
requirements, the Court required that taxpayers have a
substantial nexus under a Commerce Clause analysis.61 “Thus
the ‘substantial nexus’ requirement is not, like due process’
‘minimum contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather
a means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.”62
The Court reinterpreted its original Bellas Hess holding. It
overruled the due process portion of Bellas Hess, but kept its
Commerce Clause holding. Now, instead of being exempt to
taxes due to its lack of due process, Bellas Hess was exempt
from state taxes because it did not have a “substantial nexus”
in the form of physical presence under a Commerce Clause
analysis.
Just like Bellas Hess, Quill had purposely availed itself of
the state, and so met modern due process requirements.63 The
question thus was whether the Commerce Clause analysis
53. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
54. Quill, 504 U.S. at 302.
55. Id. at 302-03.
56. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
57. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753,
758-60 (1967).
58. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
59. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
60. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305, 312.
61. See id. at 308, 314.
62. Id. at 302-03.
63. Id. at 308.
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would require a showing of physical presence, as the Court had
required in Bellas Hess. The North Dakota Supreme Court
held that it did not, but the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and
retained the physical presence requirement, no longer to meet
due process, but to serve the Commerce Clause.64 Since Quill
did not have a substantial physical presence in North Dakota,
it lacked the requisite “substantial nexus” and thus could not
be subject to taxation.65 In retaining the physical presence
requirement the Court admitted that were the case decided
today, it may come out differently, but principles of stare decisis
weighed heavily upon it. As a result, the Court decided to
maintain the Bellas Hess bright-line, physical presence
requirement, albeit under a different restrictive banner.66
Possibly in recognition of this dissonance between today’s likely
outcome and the commands of precedent, the Court expressly
limited its holding to sales and use taxes and left open for the
lower courts the question of whether the same requirement
would apply to other forms of taxes.67
It is important to note that under Quill’s “substantial
nexus” requirement, a de minimis physical presence is
insufficient; the test requires a “substantial connection between
the entity and the state–the “substantial nexus.” The parties
agreed that Quill possessed property within the state of North
Dakota in the form of licensed software copied on floppy
diskettes which were provided to customers.68 The Court
recognized that the presence of this intellectual property
created some nexus between Quill and North Dakota, but while
this property “might constitute some minimal nexus,” it was
64. Id. at 314-19.
65. It is important to note that the Quill court recognized that physical
presence alone was not sufficient to provide the requisite substantial nexus.
The parties agreed that Quill in fact did possess property within the state of
North Dakota in the form of licensed software which located on floppy
diskettes which were provided to customers. Id. at 315 n.8. It should also be
noted that the trial court found that the title to the goods being shipped by
common carrier passed from Quill to the purchaser at the point the
merchandise was received. This would suggest that Quill also possessed a
cumulative total of nearly $1 million dollars throughout the year. Id. at 302.
66. Quill, 504 U.S. at 317.
67. Id. at 314, 317.
68. Id. at 315, n.8. It should also be noted that the trial court found that
the title to the goods being shipped by common carrier passed from Quill to
the purchaser at the point the merchandise was received. This would suggest
that Quill also possessed a cumulative total of nearly one million dollars
throughout the year. The Court did not mention this property in any of its
analysis and did not appear to consider it in determining a substantial nexus.
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insufficient to create the requisite jurisdictional hook.69 So,
while intellectual property had created a nexus, “Quill’s
licensing of software . . . [did] not meet the ‘substantial nexus’
requirement of the Commerce Clause.”70
D. PICS – CREATING THE PERFECT TAX LOOPHOLE
In order to fully understand the taxation issues
surrounding PICs, it is important to understand what they are
and how they operate. Passive Investment Companies (PICs),
also known as Delaware Holding Companies, Intangible
Holding Subsidiaries, or Intellectual Property Holding
Companies, among other possible names, are subsidiary
corporations whose sole purpose is to hold and manage the
intellectual property of a related corporation. In addition to
providing business benefits, such as making it easier for a
corporation to manage its intellectual property, protecting
members of the corporate family from creditors and lawsuits,
and hindering hostile takeovers, the PICs may create
substantial tax benefits.71 First, the parent company, the
original owner of some form of intellectual property, creates a
wholly-owned subsidiary.72 Next, the subsidiary agrees to
exchange its stock for the parent’s intellectual property.73 At
the same time, the subsidiary licenses the intellectual property
back to the parent, the original holder, in exchange for royalty
payments.74 Ideally, these royalty payments are just below the
parent’s net profit margin.75 The effect of this system is to
convert what would be profit into a royalty payment passed
onto the PIC. By forming the subsidiary in a state which does
not tax holding companies (Delaware), does not tax royalties
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Pamela S. Chestek, Control of Trademarks by the Intellectual Property
Holding Company, 41 IDEA 1, 1 (2001).
The actual formation and
maintenance of a PIC can involve substantial tax and trademark issues.
These issues are beyond the scope of this comment and cannot be dealt with
fully. For further discussion on creation of a PIC, including examples of actual
savings a PIC can provide, see generally Ira H. Rosen, Use of a Delaware
Holding Company to Save State Income Taxes, 3-89 TAX ADVISER 180 (1989);
George T. Bell et al., A State Tax Strategy for Trademarks, 81 TRADEMARK
REP. 445 (1991).
72. Chestek, supra note 71, at 1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 8.
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(Michigan), or does not have corporate taxes at all (Nevada),
the parent essentially shifts its income into a tax free state.76
Since payments made to the PICs are tax deductible business
expenses, it appears as if the parent made little or no profit,
and thus is assessed only minimal state tax.77 In reality, the
payment to the PIC is simply passed through the PIC and
returned to the parent corporation in the form of a dividend
payment or as a loan from the subsidiary to the parent, dodging
all state taxation.78 The net effect is tax free income, or as one
court put it, “nowhere income.”79
With direct taxation of PICs in question, some states have
looked to alternate methods of taxing PICs. There are several
ways do this. For example, Alabama, Connecticut, Mississippi,
North Carolina, and Ohio have disallowed deductions for
payments made to PICs under license agreements.80 This
essentially keeps the income within the state where it can be
subjected to taxation.81 While this method eliminates the tax
loophole, it is far from perfect. Since this method essentially
allows two states to tax the same income, it may violate the fair
apportionment prong of the Complete Auto test. In essence, two
states could make claims over the same money, thereby
subjecting the PIC income to a threat of double taxation.82
A second method for states to recover lost revenue is to use
a combined reporting system, often known as the “unitary
76. Id. at 6-7.
77. Id. at 7.
78. See Chestek, supra note 71, at 7; Bell, supra note 71, at 456. By
transferring the licensing fee back to the parent through a loan, the parent’s
potential taxable equity is not increased and the parent may be able to obtain
an interest deduction, further reducing its state tax burden. Id.
79. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 15 n.1 (S.C. 1993).
80. Tun-Jen Chiang, Comment, State Taxation of Out-of-State Trademark
Holding Companies, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1547 (2003).
81. By not allowing the deduction, any payment that would convert profit
into a royalty is still considered a profit on tax returns.
82. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1547; see Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S., 274, 279 (1977). For example, if Lanco had been located in
New Jersey instead of Delaware, it would be physically present and thus
subject to the Corporate Business Tax. Under this hypothetical, say that Lane
Bryant’s payment to Lanco was $100. By refusing the deduction, Lane Bryant
must pay the disallowing state $100 of income worth in tax. At the same time,
Lanco would also be forced to pay the New Jersey tax on the $100 of royalty
income. Thus, the same $100 is subjected to double the income tax as it would
have been were it never transferred, even though it really has only been
“earned” once.
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business principle.”83 This method, currently used by sixteen
states, levies a tax on a pro rata share of all the income of a
corporation and its subsidiaries based on a three factor
apportionment formula.84 The formula is based in equal parts
on the proportion of a unitary business’s total payroll, property,
and sales which are located within the taxing state.85 Since the
overwhelming amount of the total unitary business’s payroll,
property, and sales occur in a taxing state, the taxing state
effectively captures the income of the PIC.86 In addition to
being held constitutional by the Supreme Court,87 the unitary
business principle removes tax incentives to shift income
within the corporate structure, yet allows such transfers where
they result in other types of economic benefit.88 For this
reason, this method is generally favored by academics.89 While
the unitary business principle appears superior, moving to this
system requires wholesale changes to a state’s revenue code,
which comes with a high price, making it impracticable for
some states.90
A final method is to view the PIC as a “phantom entity” or
This determination is based on
a “sham corporation.”91
whether the subsidiary “lacked economic substance.”92 Once
this label is applied, the state treats the PIC as another office
or branch of the corporation, and attributes the PIC’s income to
the already physically present corporation.93 For example, in
83. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1550-52.
84. Id.
85. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170
(1983).
86. Again, assume that Lane Bryant had made a $100 payment to Lanco.
Since Lanco has only a negligible level of payroll, property, or sales, only a
negligible amount of the Lanco/Lane Bryant family’s income is attributed to it
and subject to taxation by the PIC’s home state. The remainder of the income
remains with Lane Bryant, where it will be subject to state taxation. In
essence, since the apportionment factors are based on external factors, shifting
money from one branch to another does not affect state taxation levels.
87. See Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 183-85.
88. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1552.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Ashley B. Howard, Comment, Does the Internal Revenue Code Provide
a Solution to a Common State Taxation Problem?: Proposing State Adoption of
§ 367(D) to Tax Intangibles Holding Subsidiaries, 53 EMORY L.J. 561, 579
(2004).
92. Id.
93. See id.
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Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc.,94 the court found that
two PICs, SYL, Inc. and Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc.
each lacked sufficient substance to be recognized as separate
entities.95 Both PICs were Delaware corporations and utilized
a “nexus service” in Delaware to manage their businesses.
Neither entity had more than $1,200 in total payroll per year,
and neither incurred virtually any expenses.96 However, this
method of reaching PICs is unreliable—many PICs are not
shams. As discussed above, PICs may provide a number of
legitimate benefits in addition to their use as a tax loophole.
Furthermore, this does not solve the problem as forcing the PIC
creators to provide the needed economic substance does little
more than increase the cost of operating the shelter.97 As long
as the tax savings outweigh the costs of providing the necessary
economic substance, companies will still have an incentive to
use PICs, providing little help to revenue starved states.98
94. 825 A.2d 399 (Md. 2003).
95. Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., 825 A.2d at 415.
96. See id. at 402. A “nexus service” is a company which specializes in
providing office management services in Delaware. For example, Registered
Agents Legal Services, LLC provides a wide range of services for the creation
of a Delaware Holding Company. See Registered Agent Legal Services, LLC,
Incorporation
Improves
Your
Bottom
Line,
available
at
http://www.inclegal.com/how2improve.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
97. See Bell, supra note 71, at 449-50. According to Bell, to avoid being
considered a sham corporation, the parent should follow a number of
guidelines when forming and operating a PIC. This includes maintaining an
office in the PIC’s state, producing stationary or business cards, setting up a
home banking account, maintaining a physical presence in the PIC’s state
(such as office furniture, equipment, etc.), and holding meetings in the PIC’s
state. Id. This does not change the essential feature of the PIC, but merely
adds to the transactional costs of forming and operating one. While this
increased cost may cause some businesses to find a PIC inefficient, this hardly
solves the problem of dealing with large companies such as The Limited, Inc.
98. For example, assume a sham PIC costs $1,000 per year to maintain,
but a PIC with economic substance costs $5,000. The “sham entity” view
simply means that the company paying between $1,000 and $5,000 in state
taxation will no longer find a PIC economically feasible. Companies saving
over $5,000 per year in state taxation will still find the system useful and
would continue to operate the PIC. For a company such as Lanco, which was
able to save The Limited, Inc. hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxation in
one state alone, the “sham entity” doctrine poses little threat. See Secretary of
Revenue v. A&F Trademark, Inc., Admin. Decision No. 381 at 26-27 (N.C. Tax
Review Bd. May 7 2002), available at http://www.dor.state.nc.us/
practitioner/hearing/A&F_TrademarkDecision2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2005); cf. Rosen, supra note 71, at 180 (providing an analysis of the potential
tax savings by using a PIC, including a simple breakdown of operational
expenses).
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E. GEOFFREY, INC. V. SOUTH CAROLINA – HOW SOUTH CAROLINA
STUCK ITS NECK OUT AND CAPTURED THE GIRAFFE
Faced with dramatically declining revenues, states have
attempted to either recapture the PIC payments and subject
them to taxation, or have attempted to tax the PICs directly. 99
PICs and their parent companies have fought back, claiming
the state methods violate the constitutional restrictions on
state taxing power. The first of these cases, Geoffrey, Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission,100 was brought in 1993, just a
year after Quill was decided.101 Geoffrey, Inc., a PIC utilized
by Toys R Us, held several valuable trademarks and trade
names, including the name Toys R Us, Inc., which it then
licensed back to Toys R Us for use in its retail stores.102 As a
part of the agreement, Toys R Us paid Geoffrey one percent of
the net sales of the licensed material.103 Originally, the South
Carolina Tax Commission disallowed Toys R Us’s deduction of
royalty payments made to Geoffrey, but it later rescinded on
this position and instead directly assessed Geoffrey with its
state business income tax based on the royalties received for
use of Geoffrey’s intellectual property in the South Carolina
Toys R Us stores.104 Geoffrey paid under protest and brought a
claim for a refund of the taxes, asserting that it did not have
the requisite substantial nexus with South Carolina.105
In accordance with Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,106 the
Geoffrey court separated the due process concerns from the
Dormant Commerce Clause requirement of a “substantial
nexus.” The court began by analyzing Geoffrey’s claim that the
Commission failed to satisfy the due process requirements.107
Based on Geoffrey’s contacts with South Carolina, the Geoffrey
In addition to the licensed
court found that it had.108
99. See John A. Swain, State Income Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and
Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 321 n.1 (2003).
100. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
101. Geoffrey v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 992 (1993).
102. Id. at 15.
103. Id. This method enabled Geoffrey, who had no full-time employees, to
generate approximately $55 million in income, all free of state taxation. Id. at
15 n.1.
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id.
106. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
107. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16.
108. Id.
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intellectual property the court found Geoffrey also possessed a
franchise and accounts receivable in South Carolina.109
According to the court, while there were no Toys R Us stores in
South Carolina at the time it created its licensing agreement,
Geoffrey had purposely availed itself in South Carolina since it
was not brought into South Carolina unwillingly, nor did it
prohibit the use of the intangibles in the state.110 While not
required for due process, the court also found that the
“presence of Geoffrey’s intangible property” provided an
additional contact.111 Geoffrey had challenged this point,
arguing that the situs of its intangibles was its corporate
headquarters in Delaware, not in South Carolina. The court
rejected this contention, citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner
of Taxes of Vermont112 for the proposition that intangible
property may have a situs in more than one jurisdiction, and
thus could exist in both Delaware and South Carolina.113
Finding that Geoffrey possessed intangible property in and
purposefully directed its activity at South Carolina, the court
109. Id.
110. Id. The court stated:
Geoffrey argues that the [Tax] Commission has failed to satisfy [due
process] requirements. We disagree. The nexus requirement of the
Due Process Clause can be satisfied even where the corporation has
no physical presence in the taxing state if the corporation has
purposely directed its activity at the state’s forum.
Id.
111. Id. “In addition to our finding that Geoffrey purposely directed its
activities toward South Carolina, we find that the “minimum connection”
required by due process also is satisfied by the presence of Geoffrey’s
intangible property in this State.” Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16.
112. 445 U.S. 425 (1980). The case involved a question of whether Vermont
could consider income Mobil Oil received in the form of dividends from foreign
subsidiaries which were paid in New York. The Supreme Court determined
that “[a]lthough a fictionalized situs for intangible property sometimes has
been invoked to avoid multiple taxation of ownership, there is nothing
talismanic about the concepts of ‘business situs’ or ‘commercial domicile’ that
automatically renders those concepts applicable when taxation of income from
intangibles is at issue.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S.
425, 445 (1980). The Supreme Court also stated:
The Court also has recognized that the reason for a single place of
taxation no longer obtains when the taxpayer’s activities with respect
to the intangible property involve relations with more than one
jurisdiction. Even for property or franchise taxes, apportionment of
values is not unknown. Moreover, cases upholding allocation to a
single situs for property tax purposes have distinguished income tax
situations where the apportionment principle prevails.
Id. (citations and internal quotes omitted).
113. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 16-18.
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held that Geoffrey could be taxed without violating the Due
Process Clause.114
The court then moved to the Commerce Clause portion of
its analysis.115 Geoffrey argued that it did not have the
requisite substantial nexus with South Carolina since it was
not physically present within the state, relying on the
Commerce Clause portion of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois116 and Quill. The court found
that reliance on Bellas Hess and Quill was “misplaced” since
the physical presence requirement was limited to sales and use
taxes only.117 Justifying its conclusion in part on the Supreme
Court’s decision in International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin
Department of Taxation,118 the court found that “[t]he presence
of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus.”119
Thus the only remaining question was whether this nexus was
“substantial.” The court did not articulate the ultimate value of
Geoffrey’s activities in South Carolina, but concluded that “by
licensing intangibles for use in [South Carolina] and deriving
income from their use [there], Geoffrey [had] a ‘substantial
nexus’ with [the state].”120
Thus, Geoffrey represents two important points, both of
which were rejected by the Lanco court. First, the physical
presence requirement set forth in Bellas Hess is limited to sales
and use taxes only.121 Second, Geoffrey states that property
need not be tangible in order to be considered present in the
114. Id.
115. Id. at 18.
116. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
117. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
118. 322 U.S. 435 (1944). International Harvester involved a challenge to a
Wisconsin tax on dividends distributed by corporations doing business in
Wisconsin, which included International Harvester.
Id. at 438.
The
stockholders challenged the tax on due process grounds, as they had no
physical connection with the state. Id. at 439-40. The Supreme Court rejected
the challenge on the basis that the stockholders had received benefits from the
state, even though they had no physical presence in the state. Id. at 441-43.
119. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18 (citing International Harvester Co. v.
Wisconsin Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944); Dairy Queen Corp. v.
Taxation and Revenue Dep’t, 605 P.2d 251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (involving
taxation of franchise agreements)).
120. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
121. Id. “It is well settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible,
physical presence in a state for income to be taxable there. The presence of
intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus.” Id. (emphasis
added).
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state, and thus create nexus.122 While Geoffrey, Inc. filed for a
Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court, this writ was
rejected, and the Supreme Court let the decision stand.123
F. STICKING ITS NECK OUT THERE: STATES CONSIDER WHETHER
GEOFFREY WAS THE CORRECT DECISION
Geoffrey has received mixed reviews. Some commentators
attacked it as a renegade decision or out of line with Quill.124
For example, one commentator questioned whether Geoffrey’s
position on the location of intangibles was necessary, and
argued that the decision should be questioned for both purpose
and accuracy, ultimately concluding that the court “directly
contravened the intent of the Supreme Court” by not requiring
Other
a physical presence for income tax purposes.125
commentators have rejected the arguments put forth by
Geoffrey’s critics.126 For example, one article claimed the
criticisms were directed at Geoffrey “in essence for not paying
lip service to the notion of physical presence,” even though it
could have easily done so without impacting the crux of its
analysis.127
Courts have also treated Geoffrey with inconsistent and
122. Id. at 17.
123. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue and Taxation, 510 U.S. 992
(1993). Of course, it should be noted that denial of a petition for a writ of
certiorari imparts no implication or inference on the Court’s views of the
merits of a case. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363,
365 (1973); cf. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1985).
124. Swain, supra note 99, at 359 (noting that many commentators
attacked Geoffrey); see also Douglas Poms, Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission: South Carolina Sticks its Neck Out and Taxes Delaware Holding
Company, 13 VA. TAX REV. 771 (1994); Mark A. McGinnis, Marching to the
Beat of the Itinerant Drummer: States Increasingly Refuse to Get Physical
before Finding Nexus, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 149, 175-78 (2003).
125. Douglas Poms, Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission:
South Carolina sticks its Neck out and Taxes Delaware Holding Company, 13
VA. TAX REV. 771, 779-80 (1994).
126. See, e.g., Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional
Nexus, Intangible Property and the State Taxation of Income, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 407, 441-47 (1994) (stating that Geoffrey relied on a doctrine that dates
back almost one hundred years and has gained state reliance); see also John A.
Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy
Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, supra note 99, at 358-62 (2003)
(agreeing with Geoffrey’s outcome, but noting that states are timid to
implement it).
127. Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical “Physical
Presence” Constitutional Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105, 137 (2000).
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mixed results. For example, in Couchot v. State Lottery
Commission,128 the court cited Geoffrey for support in its
decision to reject a physical presence requirement on taxation
of lottery winnings,129 and in GMC v. City of Seattle,130 the
court used Geoffrey to reject a physical presence requirement
for a business and occupation tax.131 The clearest example of
Geoffrey’s acceptance comes out of North Carolina, in A & F
Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson.132 Tolson is identical to Lanco,
except that North Carolina sought to include the other
members of The Limited, Inc. family as well.133 Just as in
Lanco and Geoffrey, the taxpayers challenged the authority of
North Carolina to assess them with a tax without a showing of
physical presence.134 Ultimately, the Tolson court decided to
follow Geoffrey and assess the PICs with state taxes. Of course,
this put North Carolina directly at odds with the decision in
Lanco.135 Instead of just dismissing Lanco as non-controlling,
the court analyzed Lanco’s justifications, disagreeing with each
of them.136
Other courts have either explicitly or implicitly rejected
Geoffrey, requiring a physical presence of tangible property no
matter what type of tax is being applied.137 An argument has
been put forth that Geoffrey’s cool reception may not indicate
128. 659 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio 1996).
129. Couchot v. State Lottery Comm’n, 659 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ohio 1996).
It should be noted that the court nevertheless found that physical presence
would nonetheless exist in the case. Id. This statement, however, is dicta and
does not impact the cases proposition.
130. 25 P.3d 1022 (Wash. App. 2001).
131. GMC v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022, 1029 (Wash. App. 2001); see,
e.g., Borden Chems. & Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. 2000)
(interest in partnership creates substantial nexus).
132. 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
133. See A & F Trademark v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 189 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004). In fact, Lanco, Inc. was one of the named parties to the case. Id. Just
as in Lanco, North Carolina sought to tax the PICs with its version of the state
franchise tax. Id.
134. See id. at 193.
135. Id. at 196.
136. See id. at 195-96.
137. See, e.g., Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 654 N.E.2d 954,
960-61 (N.Y. 1995); Scholastic Book Clubs v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 N.W.2d
692, 694 (Mich. App. 1997); Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp. 18 S.W.3d
296, 300-01 (Tex. App. 2000) (finding licensing agreement insufficient to
create substantial nexus as it was not physically present); Cerro Copper
Prods., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, No. F-94-444, 1995 Ala. Tax LEXIS 211,
at *4-6 (Admin. Law Div. Dec. 11, 1995).
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its weakness, but may have resulted from uncertain readings of
Quill, taxpayer willingness to litigate the issue, and timid
taxing authorities who are unwilling to test the limits of
Quill.138 Judging from the number of decisions which have
refused to require a physical presence, yet find physical
presence in dicta, this may be an accurate reading.139
III. LANCO, INC.–PHYSICAL OR NOT? PRESENT OR NOT?
NEW JERSEY TAXES, PICS AND PHYSICAL PRESENCE
In the middle of this morass of changing doctrines,
conflicting cases and divergent analysis, Lanco, Inc. challenged
New Jersey’s ability to assess it, and other similarly situation
PICs, with the New Jersey Corporate Business Tax. Lanco,
Inc., the PIC affiliated with Lane Bryant, a national clothing
retailer and a part of The Limited, Inc. family of corporations,
licensed various forms of intellectual property to Lane
Bryant.140 Lanco did not have any offices, employees, real or
tangible property in New Jersey; however, it held the rights to
intangible property in the form of trademarks, trade names,
and service marks which it licensed to Lane Bryant for use in
138. John A. Swain, supra note 99, at 361.
139. See, e.g., GMC v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022, 1029 (Wash. App.
2001); Couchot v. State Lottery Comm’n., 659 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio 1996)
(refusing to extend physical presence requirement to lottery winnings;
however, the court, in dicta, did state that physical presence would be met
since the income relates to taxpayer’s presence in state at time of purchase of
ticket); J.C. Penny Nat’l. Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 842 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999) (while the court was careful not to require a physical presence, it did
state that the Commissioner of Revenue cited no authority by the Supreme
Court which had upheld a state tax where the taxpayer had no physical
presence); Truck Renting & Leasing Ass’n., Inc. v. Comm’r. of Revenue 746
N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2001). The court declined to extend a physical presence
requirement to income taxes, yet based its decision to tax the Plaintiff on
account of the physical presence of the trucks in the state, even though
Plaintiff had no control over them. See Truck Renting & Leasing Ass’n., Inc.,
746 N.E.2d at 149-50. The court did not mention the lease agreement when
determining whether there was a substantial nexus. See id. at 150.
140. Lanco v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 203 (N.J. Tax Ct.
2003). The Limited Inc. is primarily engaged in nationwide retail of Men’s,
Women’s and Children’s clothing. Secretary of Revenue v. A&F Trademark,
Inc., Admin. Decision No. 381 at 4 (N.C. Tax Review Bd. May 7 2002),
available
at
http://www.dor.state.nc.us/practitioner/hearing/A&F_TrademarkDecision2002.
pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). The Limited, Inc. has seven subsidiary
clothing retailers. Each of these has a corresponding PIC which is either a
subsidiary of The Limited or a second generation subsidiary under Limco
Investments, Inc. See id. at 5. These include the popular brands of
Abercrombie and Fitch, Victoria’s Secret, Express and The Limited.
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its New Jersey stores.141 In exchange for the use of Lanco’s
intellectual property rights, Lane Bryant would pay royalties to
Lanco. Viewing the licensing agreement as a form of doing
business in the state, the New Jersey Department of Revenue
assessed Lanco with the Corporate Business Tax, the state’s
business income tax.142 Lanco’s ultimate question therefore
became: does a company whose sole connection with a state is a
licensing agreement on intellectual property located within the
state have a sufficient nexus with the state such that it may be
subject to local income taxes?
The Lanco court began by setting out the four part
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady143 test outlined above.144
Focusing on the “substantial nexus” prong, the court opened
with a lengthy discussion of Quill Corp v. North Dakota,145 its
treatment of “substantial nexus” both in terms of Due Process
and Commerce Clauses, and whether the physical presence
requirement applied to all taxes or was limited to sales and use
taxes.146 In particular, the court noted that Quill removed the
physical presence requirement under due process, but not
under the Commerce Clause.147 The court recognized the
requirement relied a great deal on stare decisis; however, the
court noted that Quill also analyzed the requirement on its own
merits.148 This analysis was important since,
[t]he decisive question in [Lanco] is whether the physical presence
requirement confirmed in Quill under the Commerce Clause applies
simply to the use tax collection obligation directly at issue in that
case, or whether it is also a necessary element of substantial nexus
for the imposition of a state income or franchise tax.149

Materially indistinguishable from Geoffrey, Inc. v. South
141. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 203.
142. Id. The New Jersey Corporate Business Tax is a franchise tax for the
privilege of doing business in New Jersey. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-1-41
(West 2002 & Supp. 2004). Out of state corporations must apportion a share
of its overall income to New Jersey. Id. The percentage that is assigned to
New Jersey is derived using an equation which is based on the corporation’s
value of property, sales and payroll which exist in New Jersey as compared to
its total value. Id.
143. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
144. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 204.
145. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
146. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 204.
147. Id. at 204-05.
148. See id. at 206-07.
149. See id. at 207.
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Carolina Tax Commission,150 the South Carolina Supreme
Court had already answered this question by holding that the
physical presence requirement set forth in National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois151 and redefined
in Quill did not apply to an income tax.152 The Lanco court
could choose to follow South Carolina or venture on its own. It
chose the latter, finding the Geoffrey court’s decision “not
persuasive.”153 The Lanco court cited three reasons for its
disagreement: the lack of differences between the Corporate
Business Tax, the use and sales taxes at issue in Quill and
Bellas Hess, cases prior to Quill that suggested physical
presence was required, and the lack of acceptance of Geoffrey
by other states.154
The court took the view that administrative difficulties
encountered by a business forced to collect a sales and use tax,
difficulties which concerned both the Quill and Bellas Hess
courts, are equally present in administration of the income
tax.155 As the court saw it, “[i]f physical presence is a
constitutional necessity for one [type of tax], it is illogical that
it should not be for both.”156 Additionally, the court found
precedent prior to the Quill decision to be consistent with its
position, although it did not cite cases in support of its position.
Rather, the court cited a number of cases which appeared to
forego a physical presence requirement, but found these cases
to be inapplicable, pointing out that each involved a taxed
entity that had some degree of tangible physical presence in the
taxing state.157 The court then used Geoffrey’s lack of broad
acceptance as another justification for it to reject Geoffrey’s
reasoning.158 As it had done with the pre-Quill cases, the court
did not cite a case supporting its position, choosing instead to
distinguish those cases which followed Geoffrey’s rejection of a
150. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
151. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
152. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 15-18 (S.C.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
153. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 207.
154. Id. at 208.
155. Id. at209.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 211-12.
158. Id. at 213-14.
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physical presence requirement.159 With each, the court found
them inapplicable since each taxpayer had at least some level
of physical presence in the taxing state.160
From the outset, the parties had stipulated that Lanco did
not have a physical presence of tangible property in New
Jersey.161 Thus, the conclusion that Bellas Hess and Quill
mandated a physical presence before an entity could be taxed
in compliance with the Commerce Clause was a dispositive one.
Because New Jersey was unable to show that Lanco had the
necessary physical contacts with the state, the court held that
constitutional restraints prevented New Jersey from assessing
Lanco with the Corporate Business Tax. This allowed Lane
Bryant and The Limited corporate family to continue to use the
PIC loophole to avoid taxation in New Jersey.
IV. THERE’S NO NEED TO GET PHYSICAL–LANCO, INC.
INCORRECTLY APPLIES A PHYSICAL PRESENCE
REQUIREMENT TO INCOME TAXES
The decisive question for the Lanco court was whether the
physical presence requirement of “substantial nexus” under the
Commerce Clause applied to income taxes. Geoffrey, Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission,162 the only case directly on
point, held that it did not; whereas, Lanco found Geoffrey to be
unpersuasive and held that the physical requirement did apply.
A deeper look at Lanco’s arguments actually demonstrates that
Geoffrey’s holding is correct and Lanco was incorrectly decided.
A. BURDENS ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND DIFFERENTIATING
THE TAXES
In deciding whether to extend Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota’s163 physical presence requirement to income taxes, the
Lanco court found no reason to distinguish between income and
sales taxes.164 In reality, there are a number of reasons to
distinguish between the two forms of tax. First, there are
differences in administrative burdens.
For any multijurisdictional business, the sheer number of possible taxes can
159. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 213-14.
160. Id. at 212-14.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 203.
437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992).
Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 209.
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be onerous. Recognizing this fact, both Quill and Bellas Hess
discussed concerns about mail order carriers being subject to
more than six thousand taxing jurisdictions,165 the “many
variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions and in
administrative and record-keeping requirements,”166 which
could create “a welter of complicated obligations.”167 By its
very nature, the burden multiple taxing jurisdictions create
falls harder on interstate businesses, which conduct activities
in several jurisdictions and may be forced to complete returns
for each of those jurisdictions. When revisiting the point in
Quill, the Court stated that imposing the duty to collect a sales
or use tax such as the one suggested by North Dakota, which
required a vendor to collect the tax if it made as few as three
advertisements in the state, might unduly burden interstate
commerce.168 Justice White, on the other hand, rejected the
excessive burden argument. According to Justice White, with
modern technology, filing in each of these six thousand
jurisdictions, both at the state and local levels, may only
impose nominal expenses.169
Either way, the concern for administrative burden is not as
prevalent with regard to income taxes. Compared to sales and
use taxes, relatively few jurisdictions charge an income tax.170
If the expense of monitoring six thousand jurisdictions charging
a sales and use tax is nominal, as suggested by Justice White,
then the expense of monitoring activity in jurisdictions with
Thus, if
income taxes is only a fraction of nominal.171
protecting against unnecessary burdens is a goal, income taxes
165. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6; National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60.
166. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60.
167. Id. at 760.
168. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6. It should be noted that the Court did
not say that such a tax would “necessarily” pose an excessive burden on the
vendor. Furthermore, it could well be argued that the North Dakota tax
would violate the “substantial” portion of the nexus test. While courts have
found a nexus on thin strands of nexus, simply sending three advertisements
into the state appears to be excessively low. Thus it may well be that the
burdens caused in relation to the incredibly insubstantial nexus would make
such the North Dakota tax suspect.
169. See id. at 332 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1545.
171. Again, adherence to the requirement of a substantial nexus would
help eliminate this concern. By requiring the taxpayer have a substantial
nexus with a state, any potential administrative burden, which according to
Justice White is nominal at best, can be spread across the larger number of
connections to the state. This makes administrative burdens even less of a
concern for both sales and income taxes.
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need less scrutiny than sales and use taxes.
There are other reasons to differentiate between sales and
use taxes and income taxes. For example, an economic theory
known as “forwardshifting” suggests that sales and use taxes
may be more disruptive to the national economy.172 Assuming
a seller operates on a profit-maximizing strategy, a tax on
income will not affect the price or quantity of goods supplied
since a change in either will reduce taxable income and thus
reduce the seller’s profits.173 A sales or use tax, however,
increases the ultimate price to the consumer, the individual
who ultimately bears the tax burden.174 Since the sales tax is
based on total revenues and not net profits, it is possible to
reduce the ultimate tax burden by simply selling fewer units,
thereby reducing overall revenues.175 If the combination of cost
savings, including taxes, is greater than the lost profit, it is
economically rational for sellers to limit sales.176 In essence,
some of the seller’s tax burden can be “forwardshifted” to the
consumer.177 This may result in lowered overall sales, thereby
reducing the overall level of interstate commerce.178 Since the
Commerce Clause, which guides the substantial nexus
requirement, is concerned with the effect of state and local
action on the national economy, “forwardshifting” should
subject sales taxes to greater scrutiny than income taxes.179 As
a result, sales and use taxes should be subject to greater
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause than income taxes.
Furthermore, requiring a physical presence for income
taxes potentially exempts entire industries from state
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Chiang, supra note 80, at 1540.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1541.

178. Chiang, supra note 80, at 1542.
179. But see id. Chiang concludes that this economic theory actually runs
against Geoffrey since “one goal of the dormant Commerce Clause is to ensure
that each state taxes only its ‘fair share’ of interstate commerce.” He argues
that a physical presence requirement is needed since income taxes do not
allow companies to shift the burden back to the state’s citizens, and thus allow
states to place an unfair burden on out-of-state companies. While it may be
true that income taxes place a greater burden on out-of-state sellers, this is an
issue for the discrimination prong of the Complete Auto Transit, Inc. test, not
the nexus requirement.
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taxation.180 Quill and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department
of Revenue of Illinois181 carved out a “discrete realm of
commercial activity that is free from interstate taxation.”182 By
using PICs to shift income to non-taxing states, companies are
able to avoid paying for state provided protections. “It was not
the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in
interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden
even though it increases the cost of doing business.”183 It is this
threat of allowing businesses to avoid all state taxation that
makes a blanket physical presence requirement “potentially
dangerous.”184
The Lanco court’s proposition that “[i]f physical presence is
a constitutional necessity for one [type of tax], it is illogical that
it should not be for both”185 does not stand up to scrutiny.
Sales and use taxes and income taxes are functionally different
and ultimately have different effects on taxed entities. Simply
put, income taxes carry fewer administrative burdens for the
taxpayer and pose less of a threat to interstate commerce.
Unlike a sales or use tax, which is paid by every consumer,
creative tax planners can exempt entire industries from income
taxation. Accordingly, it is illogical for a court to apply the
same analysis to the constitutionality of income taxes as it does
to sales and use taxes.
B. PRIOR PRECEDENT AND PHYSICAL PRESENCE
Quill did not state whether the physical presence
requirement should be extended to income taxes. However, the
Lanco court found that “[t]he conclusion that physical presence
is necessary to support state taxation of income is fully
consistent with and strongly suggested by the Commerce
Clause cases decided before Quill.”186 Analysis of these prior
cases reveals the opposite.
The Supreme Court has in fact applied a tax without
finding physical presence on more than one occasion. For
180. See Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical
“Physical Presence” Constitutional Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105, 110 (2000).
181. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
182. See Quill, 580 U.S. at 314.
183. W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
184. Fatale, supra note 180, at 110.
185. Id.
186. Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 209 (N.J. Tax Ct.
2003).
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example, in Whitney v. Graves,187 the Court upheld New York’s
tax on the sale of an intangible right, even though the taxed
person had no physical presence in the state.188 In Whitney, a
Massachusetts company was a member of the New York Stock
When the NYSE expanded its
Exchange (NYSE).189
membership, the Massachusetts company was entitled to a
portion of the new membership, which the Massachusetts
company sold.190 New York tried to tax the sale and the
company fought.191 The Lanco court found the use of this case
unpersuasive because, “Whitney is also a due process case, in
which New York was found to have jurisdiction to tax a
Massachusetts resident on income from the sale of a right
derived from a sale on the [NYSE].”192 Contrary to this
assertion, nowhere did the Supreme Court discuss due process
restrictions on a state’s taxing power. Instead, the Court
focused on whether the Massachusetts company had created a
“business situs” in New York, which would then give New York
the authority to subject it to state taxation.193 As the Court
stated,
When we speak of a “business situs” of intangible property in the
taxing State we are indulging in a metaphor. We express the idea of
localization by virtue of the attributes of the intangible right in
relation to the conduct of affairs at a particular place. The right may
grow out of the actual transactions of a localized business or the right
may be identified with a particular place because the exercise of the
right is fixed exclusively or dominantly at that place . . . . We think
that the dominant attribute of relator’s membership in the New York
Stock Exchange so links it to the situs of the Exchange as to localize it
at that place and hence to bring it within the taxing power of New
York. Accordingly we hold that in laying the tax upon the profits
derived by the relator from the sale of the right appurtenant to his
membership the State did not exceed the bounds of its jurisdiction.194

Thus, Whitney is not a due process case and it closely
187. 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
188. See Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366, 372-74 (1937).
189. Id. at 369.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 210. Note that even if Whitney was a due
process case, it should still guide modern Commerce Clause nexus
requirements. As discussed earlier, the substantial nexus requirement was
originally conceived of as a due process test. It was not until Quill that the
substantial nexus test was placed under a Commerce Clause analysis.
Whitney’s physical presence “nexus” requirement was read under the Due
Process Clause, as were all other physical presence cases.
193. Whitney, 299 U.S. at 372-73
194. Id. at 372.
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resembles Lanco. In both cases, an entity possessing an
intangible right in another state sells or licenses the property
to another for a fee. The state then uses that fee as a basis for
determining the applicable state tax due. Whitney found that
such a tax was within New York’s power; Lanco found that
New Jersey did not have that same right.
The Lanco court also cited International Harvester Co. v.
In International
Wisconsin Department of Taxation.195
Harvester Co., the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin’s tax on
derivatives paid out by a Wisconsin corporation was
substantial, even though the vast majority of the shareholders
had no physical presence in the state.196 The Geoffrey court
cited this case to support the proposition that a state may tax
the income of a non-resident that is fairly attributed either to
property in the state or to events or transactions which receive
Lanco disagreed with
protections from the state.197
Geoffrey’s198 reading and saw International Harvester Co. as a
tax on the corporation.199 Contrary to the suggested reading in
Lanco, the tax did not come out of the corporation’s general
fund; it came out of the pockets of the shareholders. Therefore,
the tax would not have been assessed had the derivative not
been paid.200 The burden did not fall on the corporation; it fell
on the shareholders.201 To call the tax at issue in International
Harvester Co. a tax on the corporation would be analogous to
calling the income taxes taken from an employee’s paycheck a
tax on their employer, not the employee, a proposition that
would likely not find support from America’s workforce. Thus,
International Harvester Co. demonstrated that source and
benefits, not physical presence, are the hallmark of the
requisite Commerce Clause nexus.202
C. STATE COURT ADOPTION OF GEOFFREY
Lanco’s final justification for not following Geoffrey, Inc. v.
195. 322 U.S. 435(1944).
196. International Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435,
441-42 (1944).
197. Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993).
198. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
199. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 211 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003).
200. See International Harvester, 322 U.S. at 439.
201. Id.
202. See Swain, supra note 99, at 349-51.

OLSON_4_24_2005

2005]

7/11/2006 6:47:00 PM

LANCO, INC

130

South Carolina Tax Commission203 was the failure by state
Despite the lack of
courts to adopt its analysis.204
overwhelming acceptance, Geoffrey has not been outright
rejected. In fact, a number of courts have followed Geoffrey’s
lead in finding the physical presence requirement inapplicable
to income taxes.205 In fact, three of the cases cited by Lanco as
physical presence cases, Truck Renting & Leasing Association
v. Commissioner of Revenue,206 Couchot v. State Lottery
Commission,207 and General Motors Corp. v. City of Seattle,208
are silent on the issue of physical presence, or actually held
that physical presence is not required. 209
First, in Truck Renting & Leasing, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that a business with leased trucks
entering Massachusetts was subject to income taxes, even if the
lessor did not own or maintain a place of business in
Massachusetts.210 Like Lanco, the taxpayer protested the tax
in part on its lack of physical presence in Massachusetts.211 In
its discussion of the Commerce Clause restrictions, the Truck
Renting & Leasing court neither adopted nor declined a
physical presence requirement, noting that neither party has
argued that such a test would apply.212 This is no more a
rejection of Geoffrey as it is an adoption of its reasoning and
offers little support for Lanco.
In analyzing the next cases cited in its decision, Couchot
and General Motors Corp., the Lanco court relied on dicta it
found in the cases to support its position. The Lanco court used
Couchot as support for the physical presence requirement.
203. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
204. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 213.
205. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
206. 746 N.E. 2d 143 (Mass. 2001).
207. 659 N.E.2d 1225 (Ohio 1996).
208. 25 P.3d 1022 (Wash. App. 2001), review denied, 84 P.3d 1230 (Wash.
2004), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002).
209. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 213.
210. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass’n. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 746 N.E.2d
143, 150 (Mass. 2001).
211. Id. at 146.
212. Id. at 149 n.13. The court stated:
In [Quill], the Court upheld a “physical-presence requirement” before
a State, consistent with the commerce clause, could subject an out-ofState vendor to a use or sales tax. The court did not extend this rule
to other types of taxes. Neither party has argued that such a
requirement would apply to the tax at issue here.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Couchot involved a challenge to Ohio’s taxation of lottery
winnings by a recipient who had no physical presence in
Ohio.213 The court specifically held that physical presence was
not a requisite for income taxes.214 However, in dicta, the court
conceded that had physical presence been required, by entering
the state to purchase the lottery ticket, the recipient of the
winnings would have had the requisite physical presence in
Ohio.215 The Lanco court looked past the conditional language
and used the dicta of Couchot as evidence of the physical
presence requirement. Couchot’s holding runs right up against
the Lanco decision, not with it.
Much the same could be said for General Motors Corp. In
General Motors Corp., the court adopted Geoffrey’s market
exploitation criteria instead of requiring physical presence.216
The General Motors Corp. court declined to extend Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota’s217 requirement to the tax at issue.218 As it
had in Couchot, the court again looked past the General Motors
Corp. holding, and asserted that the General Motors could be
subject to taxation since, “[i]t is clear . . . that the automobile
manufacturers had a physical presence in the taxing
jurisdiction.”219 Thus, the court appeared to be less concerned
with the holding than with the facts surrounding the case.
In order to support its contention that states have rejected
Geoffrey, Lanco relied on one case that is neutral on the issue
and two whose holdings were consistent with Geoffrey. If
following the direction of other state courts is one of the
justifications for adopting or rejecting a physical presence
requirement, the Lanco court should have actually ruled
differently.
213. See Couchot v. State Lottery Comm’n, 659 N.E.2d 1225, 1227, 1229
(Ohio 1996).
214. Id. at 1230.
215. See id.; Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200, 213 (N.J.
Tax Ct. 2003). Note that the Ohio court in Couchot did not talk about whether
entering the jurisdiction to purchase a single time would be a “substantial”
nexus. This further demonstrates that the physical presence was merely an
afterthought and cannot be viewed as one of the Court’s holdings. Couchot,
659 N.E.2d at 1225.
216. General Motors Corp. v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022, 1029 (Wash.
App. 2001), review denied 84 P.3d 1230 (2004), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056
(2002).
217. 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992).
218. General Motors Corp., 25 P.3rd at 1029.
219. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 213.
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D. CONCLUSION: LANCO INCORRECTLY GETS PHYSICAL AND
ASSAULTS THE STATE’S COFFERS
Lack of in-depth analysis, selective reading, and subtle
twisting of precedent, caused the Lanco court to incorrectly
apply a physical presence requirement for Commerce Clause
nexus.
The potential burdens associated with the
administration of sales and use taxes are not present with
income taxes, or are only a fraction of nominal costs. In
exchange, the Lanco court requires a system that could exempt
entire industries from state taxation and poses a greater threat
to the national economy, which the Dormant Commerce Clause
was intended to protect. Contrary to Lanco’s contention, prior
Supreme Court holdings actually demonstrated that a taxed
entity does not need to be physically present in a tax
jurisdiction. State courts have not overwhelmingly adopted
Geoffrey, but a small and growing number of states agree with
its holding.220 The Lanco court’s position is ill-supported and
untenable.
V. PHYSICAL PROPERTIES – WHY THE LANCO
EXTENSION OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE STILL SHOULD
NOT HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME
A. PHYSICAL PRESENCE V. NEXUS – AN INTERCHANGEABLE
TERM USING INCOMPATIBLE WORDS
The Lanco court viewed the decision to extend the physical
presence requirement to income taxes as the determinative
question.221 However, the court missed the mark. Despite
having incorrectly extended the test, a close look at Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota’s222 articulation of a Commerce Clause nexus
demonstrates that the court should have sided with New
Jersey.
Once it was determined that a physical presence was
required, contrary to the Lanco court’s assertion, the truly
determinative questions were whether or not Lanco had the
requisite physical presence in New Jersey and, if so, whether
this presence was “substantial.” Beginning with whether
presence existed, both parties agreed that Lanco’s only
connection with New Jersey was through a licensing agreement
220. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
221. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 207.
222. 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992).
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authorizing the use of its intellectual property by Lane
Bryant.223 Accordingly, the court should have asked whether
intellectual property can be “physically present” under the test.
The Lanco court skipped this step and simply assumed that
that it could not.224 Because
[t]he decisive question in this case is whether the physical presence
requirement confirmed in Quill under the Commerce Clause applies
simply to the use tax collection obligation directly at issue in that
case, or whether it is also a necessary element of substantial nexus
for the imposition of a state income or franchise tax,225

a closer look at Quill demonstrates that intellectual property
can, in fact, be physically present.
Under circumstances similar to Lanco’s licensure of
intangible property in New Jersey, Quill possessed intangible
property in North Dakota. In addition to its physical products,
Quill licensed a computer software program to its customers
that enabled them to monitor Quill’s inventories.226 Quill
retained ownership of the actual intellectual property,227 just as
Lanco retained ownership of its intellectual property utilized by
Lane Bryant. In Quill, the Supreme Court found this situation
established a nexus with North Dakota.228 This nexus, based
on just a few floppy disks containing a computer program,
according to the Court, amounted to nothing more than a de
minimis nexus.229 The Supreme Court had previously rejected
the use of a de minimis or “slightest presence” standard.230
Under the Quill Court’s analysis, “physical presence” is a
bit of misnomer, since the connection creating the nexus need
not be physical at all. In reality “physical presence” is a
shorthand expression and description of “nexus.” The problem
with using “physical presence” to define the requisite “nexus” is
that it is under-inclusive, as it suggests that intangible
property, such as a computer program on a floppy disk, is not
enough. This sets a trap for unsuspecting courts, as happened
223. Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax 203. The parties stipulated that Lanco did not
have offices, employees or real or tangible property in New Jersey. Id.
224. Id. at 207.
225. Id.
226. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 n.1 (1992).
227. See id.
228. Id. at 315 n.8.
229. See id.
230. See id; National. Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430
U.S. 551, 556 (1977) (rejecting the California Supreme Court’s assertion that
“slightest presence” met the Commerce Clause nexus requirement).
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in Lanco court.
B. “SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS” – AN IGNORED SUBSTANTIVE
QUESTION
The test is not just whether there is a nexus between the
state and the taxpayer. De minimis contacts are insufficient; in
order to subject an entity to taxation, the nexus must be
substantial.231 As discussed above, the licensing agreement
with Lane Bryant, which was utilized by its New Jersey retail
locations, created a nexus between Lanco and New Jersey. The
Lanco court should have analyzed separately whether the
nexus was “substantial.” Having fallen into the “physical
presence” trap, the court never analyzed the question of
whether the nexus that existed was substantial. Nevertheless,
it is a question which can be quickly solved. While the court
does not state the level of activity needed, this issue is not just
about “the existence . . . of a few floppy diskettes.”232 Receiving
royalties of 5.5% of Lane Bryant’s overall sales amounts to
hundreds of thousands in IP rights.233 In terms of money or
231. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8; D.H. Homes Co. v. McNamara,
486 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1988) (finding a substantial nexus); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488
U.S. 252, 263 (1988) (doubting “that States through which the telephone call’s
electronic signals merely pass have a sufficient nexus to tax that call”).
Compare Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Was. Dept. of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560,
562 (1975) (taxing of company who employed a single agent working out of his
own home, even though he did not make any sales or take any orders
constituted a substantial nexus); Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of
N.Y., 654 N.E.2d 954, 954 (N.Y.1995) (agents entering New York to resolve
problems give instructions regarding its products created a substantial nexus,
even though the agents made no direct sales), with In re Appeal of Intercard,
Inc., 14 P.3d 1111, 1112 (Kan. 2000) (eleven trips into Kansas by employees to
install card reading units did not constitute a sufficient substantial nexus).
232. Id. at 313 n.8.
233. The number of stores located in New Jersey and their sales totals are
relatively comparable. This is based on a search of the number and sales
figures for Lane Bryant stores in both states via Lexis-Nexis’s database of
business records. From 1992 to 1994, Lanco was assessed with over $300,000
in franchise and income taxes in North Carolina. See Secretary of Revenue v.
A&F Trademark, Inc. et al., Admin. Decision No. 381 at 26-27 (N.C. Tax
Review Bd. May 7 2002), available at http://www.dor.state.nc.us/
practitioner/hearing/A&F_TrademarkDecision2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2005). While North Carolina’s sales appear to be on average higher than New
Jersey’s sales, but New Jersey’s tax is higher than North Carolina’s, which
makes up for this difference. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.3 (2004)
with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-5a(c)(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004). While this
is not perfect calculation, it does demonstrate that New Jersey was providing
protections for hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars worth of
Lanco’s intellectual property.
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time spent in the state, this level of activity goes beyond the de
minimis level. It surpasses the level that various courts,
including the Supreme Court, have found to be substantial.234
The Lanco court seemingly added the word “tangible” to
“physical presence,” a criteria which was never a part of the
Quill analysis.235 As a result of this misreading, the Lanco
court never addressed whether Lanco’s activities were
“substantial.” If Lanco’s activities in other states serve as a
reliable benchmark, undoubtedly the Court would have
concluded that the activity was substantial. New Jersey could
then rightfully subject Lanco to state taxation. In the end,
after having incorrectly required a physical presence for income
taxes, the Lanco court required a presence of “tangible”
property, even though this was never required by National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois236 or
Quill. In essence, the Lanco court had an opportunity to take
an alternate route to the correct destination, but ultimately got
lost in the quagmire of state tax precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION: LACK OF IN DEPTH ANALYSIS LEADS
TO THE WRONG DECISION
Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation237 represented
an opportunity for New Jersey to determine whether a state
could constitutionally tax an entity whose only connection with
a state was through a licensing agreement. By applying an
incorrect reading of the relevant precedent, the Lanco court
required a physical presence in order to subject a business to
the New Jersey Corporate Business Tax. Even with this error,
the court should still have found sufficient contacts with the
state to allow the tax to stand. However, it failed to fully read
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,238 and it determined that a
234. See, e.g., National Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430
U.S. 551, 554 n.2 (1977) (two small offices each staffed by four employees and
each with annual sales of less than $3,000 created a sufficient nexus);
Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Wash. Dept. of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 562
(1975) (single agent working out of his own home, even though he did not
make any sales or take any orders, creates sufficient nexus); Aloha
Freightways, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 701 N.E.2d 961 (Mass. 1998)
(company’s trucks traveling just over three thousand miles per year in
Massachusetts sufficient nexus to subject company to income tax).
235. See Lanco, 21 N.J. Tax at 200, 214 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003).
236. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
237. 21 N.J. Tax 200 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003).
238. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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licensing agreement alone could not create the requisite
“physical presence” under Commerce Clause nexus standards.
Had the court simply followed Geoffrey v. South
Carolina,239 a case which first stuck its neck out and led the
way, it would have arrived at the correct outcome. Instead, the
court ventured on its own. Along the way, it added the
unnecessary requirement that the property be “tangible” in
addition to being present, focused on dicta rather than the
holdings of prior cases, and failed to fully analyze the practical
impact of its decision. While this decision is not final,240 PICs
are currently free to grow in the Garden State.

239. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
240. See STATE OF NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, REFUND
PROCEDURES FOR CLAIMS BASED ON THE TAX COURT’S DECISION IN LANCO,
INC. V. DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSURANCE (Nov. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/index.html?
lanco.htm~mainFrame
(last updated Nov. 24, 2004).

